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Abstract 
 
In this thesis the IR-theories constructivism, liberalism and realism will be used in order to shed 
light on the security and defence policy of the European Union. Three recent developments affect 
the course of the integration process of this policy area. The first facet is the institutional change 
Brexit will bring about. The second facet is the cultural difference between the foreign policies of 
the United States and the European Union, which is enhanced by the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the US. The last facet is the geopolitical security dilemma that is imposed on the EU 
by Russia. In this research the impact of these three developments on the integration process of 
the EU’s security and defence policy will be analysed. 
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Preface 
 
The time has come for me to graduate. It took a while to come up with a subject that I was 
content with. It took an even longer while for me to finish this project successfully. The Master 
program International Relations (IR), with the specialisation International Studies, has given me 
new insights on political actors and developments on the world stage. I have also learned new 
approaches which can be used to explain political events. The knowledge I have gained and the 
research methods I have learned during my time at the University of Leiden, I have applied to 
this research.  
 
I was always interested in the European integration process of the European Union (EU). 
Therefore, I really wanted to devote my thesis to this interesting phenomenon that is always 
subject to internal and external factors. Throughout the Master program I developed an interest 
for security studies. Especially the security dilemma’s the European Union is faced with, I 
wanted to know more about. When I was reading into this theme I discovered that each 
theoretical approach in the scientific field of IR provide different explanations for the integration 
process of the EU’s security and defence policy. Also, the founding of this policy area is 
relatively new. Combine this with the recent institutional, cultural and geopolitical developments 
that determine the course of the security and defence apparatus of Brussels and one can perform 
insightful research on this subject.  
 
I have a Bachelor degree in European Studies, with a specialisation in history and transatlantic 
relations. As an historian, this research has proven to be quite a challenge because I had to focus 
on present day developments that affect the integration process of the security and defence policy 
of the EU. During this research I have learned that international politics can change any minute. I 
was confronted with several developments that influenced the outcome of my conclusion. The 
elections in Germany were exiting for me to follow. Especially the re-election of Angela Merkel 
is of influence to Germany’s stance towards Brussels. I also had to alter the title of the former 
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British Secretary of Defence of the UK, Michael Fallon, after he resigned his position because he 
got involved into a  Me Too-scandal.  
 
The poisoning of Sergey Skripal, a former spy who worked for the British secret service MI6, 
and his daughter happened just before I finished this project. Shortly after the Netherlands 
published the results of the investigation about who shot down MH17. The Netherlands 
concluded that a Russian battalion was responsible for the air crash, which costed 298 people 
their lives. Therefore, the Dutch government holds Russia accountable. However, the Kremlin 
does not acknowledge the outcome of this research. Both developments caused a diplomatic 
crisis between many European member states of the EU and Russia. 
 
Despite some hick ups during the writing process I have come to an interesting conclusion. This 
research will definitely make a contribution to the discourse of the integration process of the EU 
when it comes to the security and defence apparatus of this institution.  
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Introduction 
 
“Europe, ladies and gentlemen, should be stronger and this is particularly true when it concerns 
our defence. Europe can no longer depend on the singular power and military capacity of 
individual member states. Together we have to make sure to protect our interests.”1 
   
This quote comes from the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. In his 
speech, he held in September 2016, he called for a military headquarters of the EU in order to 
perform more effective military missions. This plan got operational in July last year, although 
under a more neutral name: the new command centre.
2
 Juncker often expresses the necessity of 
stimulating defence integration of the EU. The call for increasing security and defence integration 
comes in a time where institutional, cultural and geopolitical factors pose challenges for the 
safety of the member states of the EU.  
  
The research question of this research will be as follows: 
 
How do the latest institutional, cultural and geopolitical developments affect the integration 
process concerning the security and defence policy of the European Union?  
 
This research will be divided in five chapters. In the first chapter the EU's security and defence 
policy will be analysed on the basis of the theoretical frameworks which are used in the scientific 
world of IR. Liberalism, realism and constructivism are the theories that each shed a different 
light on this policy area. This chapter will also examine which moments promoted the integration 
process in the past. Comparable future key moments might boost the integration process. Also the  
                                                          
1
 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘Jean-Claude Juncker announces plans for a European military HQ’, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3789371/Jean-Claude-Juncker-presses-ahead-plans-EU-army-announces-
plans-European-military-HQ.html#v-5070841113250215374, published on the 14
th
 of September 2016, consulted on 
8th of June 2017. 
2
 European Union, ‘From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1’, 
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf, Brussels, published June 2017, 
consulted on the 20
th
 of February 2018. 
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challenges the integration process is faced with nowadays are central in this chapter. It is 
necessary to mention these challenges in order to reveal the current state the EU’s security and 
defence policy is in and what hurdles the integration process of this policy area has to face. 
 
In the second chapter I will analyse what Brexit will mean for the security and defence policy of 
the EU. The UK has always been one of the most influential member states, especially in the 
military domain. The EU’s security and defence policy has to anticipate on the exit of one of its 
most valuable member states, since this departure will change the institution of the EU as a 
whole. 
 
The third chapter will be devoted to the cultural difference between the foreign policies of the US 
and the EU. Now that president Donald Trump is in charge of the US the differences between the 
European and American approach to provide security for the European continent are more 
visible. Also the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might change. NATO is 
very active in Europe, especially after Russia annexed Crimea. Despite the fact that Trump 
announced that he believes NATO is outdated and needs change, NATO still is the protector of 
Europe, which means the EU is still in a dependent position.
3
 It will be interesting to see if these 
developments increase the need for the EU to become a unified front concerning security and 
defence. 
 
In the fourth chapter the research will focus on the geopolitical threat that comes from power 
block Russia. When the Cold War ended the diplomatic relationship between the EU and Russia 
seemed quite solid. However, several political developments has put the relationship on edge. 
Especially the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis showed that the wellbeing of Central 
and Eastern member states of the EU might be at risk. Therefore, the foreign policy of Russia will 
force the EU to react.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 Donald Trump, ‘N.A.T.O. is obsolete ..’, Twitter, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/712969068396093440, 
published on the 24
th
 of March 2016, consulted on the 3
rd
 of January 2017. 
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Before the conclusion of this research is presented a final analysis will be made about how the 
security and defence policy will evolve over time. The expectations about the future of this policy 
area will be based on the theoretical frameworks that were introduced in the first chapter. 
As regards to the methodology, I will use process tracing. This will help me understand if the 
integration process accelerates with the exit of one of the most influential members, the changing 
interaction between the EU, US and NATO and the presence of a strong threat perception from 
Russia, because the causality will be made clear. I will also conduct content analysis of relevant 
documents to see how the EU justifies the need for greater security and defence integration and 
what concrete steps have been made. 
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1. The EU’s security and defence policy explained 
 
The European Community, the predecessor of the EU, has been founded shortly after World War 
II  in order to safeguard peace on the continent. For over seventy years the member states have 
lived in peace. However, the EU has been challenged by several security threats ever since its 
existence. In order to tackle these issues the EU created a security and defence policy. This 
chapter will display how this policy can be explained from a theoretical point of view. This will 
help understand the integration process of the security and defence policy area of the EU. This 
chapter will also focus on events that changed the course of the integration process and what 
challenges the integration process is facing nowadays.  
  
Theoretical interpretation 
 
The EU introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992 in order to protect their interests and tackle security issues in and outside the European 
territory, in light of the new international security environment that emerged after the Cold War 
ended. An integral part of this policy is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which 
provides the CFSP with, although very limited, military capabilities. The CFSP and the CSDP are 
relatively young institutions that are evolving rapidly ever since its creation. Therefore, the 
theoretical discourse about the security and defence framework of the EU is also quite new. The 
security and defence mechanism can be studied in the field of European integration studies, 
security studies and in the field of IR. All study fields have their own theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies to explain political entities. The newness of this subject and the existence of 
multiple scientific approaches are reasons why the security and defence policy of the EU is 
undertheorized in the field of IR. Also, multiple mainstream IR-theories can be used to explain 
the security apparatus of the EU.
4 This chapter will portrait the security and defence policy of the 
EU in the light of liberalism, realism and constructivism.  
 
                                                          
4
 Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 1-2. 
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The EU itself can be seen as a soft power. The concept of soft and hard power was developed by 
Joseph Nye. A soft power is a political entity that tries to use its power to 
persuade other political entities in doing something that the soft power desires from them. Means 
of using this kind of power are most often legal or socioeconomic policies. At the moment the 
EU does not have enough military means to act as a legitimate hard power. A 
hard power uses military strength in order to coerce and enforce other political entities.
5
 Soft 
power measures are mostly propagated by normative entities who are hesitant of using hard force. 
The EU is an example of an normative political entity. Therefore, the EU itself can be best 
understood from the perspective of liberalism. 
 
From a liberal point of view one can argue that the EU is based on liberal pillars like 
multilateralism, international dialogue and socioeconomic cooperation. This will create a 
harmony of interests. These pillars are also the basis for the creation of the CFSP and CSDP.
6
 
The EU promotes norms and values, like democracy and civil and human rights and has proven 
to be a successful partner in socioeconomic relationships with other parts of the world. This work 
ethic is also present in the EU’s security and defence framework.  
The difference between other policy areas of the EU and the CSDP is that member states have  
veto power. Without consent of the member states Brussels is not able to go through with a 
policy issue they want to implement. In theory, the CSDP is based on equality of the member 
states. However, realists might argue that this is not the case in reality. Only a few stronger 
member states are able to provide the CSDP with military equipment and will therefore take the 
lead in the security and defence policy. Smaller or weaker member states will just follow the 
stronger ones.
7
 
Looking from a realist perspective the creation of a security and defence policy of the EU is the 
icing on the cake, that is to say to the integration process. Any political actor who wants to play a  
                                                          
5
 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp. 12-25. 
6
 Jolyon Howorth, ‘Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy’, West 
European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2004,  p 280. 
7
 Daniel Fiott, ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy and IR Theory’, E-International Relations, http://www.e-
ir.info/2013/08/20/the-common-security-and-defence-policy-and-ir-theory/, published on the 20
th
 of August in 2013, 
consulted on the 12
th
 of December 2017. 
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significant role on the world stage requires a security and defence policy in order to protect its 
position on the world stage.
8
 The CSDP might even be set up in order for the EU to evolve into a 
global military power the world has to reckon with.
9
 The EU has proven to be a strategic player 
when it comes to geopolitics, since it has welcomed many member states since the end of the 
Cold War. Therefore, the EU created more input for their security and defence framework. 
Currently the EU depends on NATO and the US for military support, but Brussels decided to 
increase its own hard power in order to be less depended.
10
 This development also means that the 
role of the CSDP can be ambiguous in relation to NATO and the US. Structural realists would 
argue that the CSDP can be seen as an instrument for the EU to balance power with the US, who 
is the current military hegemon in today’s world order.11 
 
However, the creation of a security and defence framework can also be reason for the EU to keep 
the US engaged with the European continent. The CSDP is not able to provide safety for its 
member states without help from the US. This might be a way for Brussels to keep a strong 
external player on the sideline, so that the strongest member states are not able to take the lead 
and overstep the smaller and less influential ones.
12
 
As mentioned earlier, the CSDP is an intergovernmental instead of a supranational policy area in 
which the member states, who possess and control the military equipment, have the final say.
13
 
This makes the nation state the central and decisive political actor. The central actor, in this case 
still twenty-eight member states, is driven by self-interest and strives for self-preservation in an 
anarchic world order.
14
 It is evident that member states still put their self-interest before the 
harmony of interests. The CFSP and the CSDP have difficulties creating a legitimate military  
                                                          
8 Kari Möttölä, ‘Drivers of defence integration within the European Union’, Paper prepared for the Sixth (SGIR) 
Pan-European International Relations Conference, 2007, p. 13. 
9
 Barry R. Posen, ‘European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?’, Security Studies, Vol. 
15, No. 2, June 2006, pp. 185-186. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Maria Strömvik, To Act as a Union: Explaining the Development of the EU’s Common Foreign Policy, Lund: 
Lund University, Department of Political Science 2005, p. 44. 
12
 Sten Rynning, ‘Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
49, No. 1, p. 37. 
13
 Fiott, ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy and IR Theory’, consulted on the 12th of December 2017. 
14
 Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli, International Relations Theory and European Security: We thought we knew, 
New York: Routledge 2016, p. 24.  
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force, because member states are hesitant of joining forces.
15
 Member states do not seem as 
committed to the CSDP as they are to their national security and defence programs. This is one of 
the flaws of the current policy which will be further discussed in another passage. 
 
The EU can only be effective if it finds common understanding of security issues. Realists would 
say that only one nation state or a group of stronger states are able to come up with a common 
view.
16
 The EU goes against this realist conception by creating a common strategic culture where 
all member states are part of. This objective was introduced in the first European Security 
Strategy, that was published in 2003.
17
 From a constructivist point of view the creation of a 
strategic culture of the EU is a process that is based on identity. Identity formation is shaped by 
open communication, socialisation and ideational discourse. A common culture is subject to the 
external environment and changes on the basis of joint experiences.
18
 A reason why member 
states would want to adapt their national security agenda’s to a European one is because most 
member states have lived in peace for many years and do not have to fear their neighbours. 
Territorial defence became a European project instead of a national one.
19
 The EU can also 
appeal to social and political values and principles that Europeans share in order to form a 
common political identity. This way the political identity is a constructed principle that is based 
on politics instead of cultural heritage. If the member states feel they value the same principles 
and have things in common when it comes to their self-identification, they are more likely to join 
forces in a common policy.
20
  
 
In practice, it is easier for the EU to find common ground among its member states about soft 
security measures. When the use of hard power might be necessary the member states are more  
 
                                                          
15
 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 
2010, p. 556-564. 
16
 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, pp. 
181-184. 
17
 European Security Strategy, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, The European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, December 2003, p. 11. 
18
 Möttölä, ‘Drivers of defence integration within the European Union’, pp. 8-9. 
19
 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, pp. 190-192. 
20
 Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge 
2006, p. 13 
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divided, which makes it difficult for the EU to come up with a unanimous course.
21
 Since new 
security dilemmas are emerging the values, principles and culture that define and guide the CSDP 
are under pressure. The creation of a common strategic culture might not be enough for the CSDP 
to be as successful as can be.
22
 Thus, in the light of constructivism the current security and 
defence policy of the EU has to overcome a big challenge. 
 
Key moments that boosted integration 
 
As mentioned earlier the ending of the Cold War changed the new world order drastically. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (SU) the immediate security threat from the East vanished. 
Although the direct threat of the communist bloc was gone, another threat on the South Eastern 
borders of the EU emerged. 
 
The Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001) caused the biggest crisis on the European continent ever since 
World War II. The war over Kosovo (1998-1999) turned out to be a key moment for the origin of 
the EU’s security and defence policy. This war showed that Brussels lacked hard power since the 
EU was not capable of sending military troops to the area.
23
 Leaders of several member states 
agreed that the EU had to become capable of preventing and resolving security threats. This was 
why the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the predecessor of the CSDP, was 
launched as part of the CFSP. This institution never really had practical effect until the St. Malo 
statement of 1998 and the Cologne and Helsinki Summits of 1999. 
  
In Cologne The European Council stated that “the EU must be able to take autonomous action. 
This must be backed up by credible military forces and must have the means to decide to use 
them.”24 In Helsinki the policies became more concrete. The European Council decided that “the 
member states should be able to deploy up to 60.000 troops within 60 days. These troops must  
 
                                                          
21
 Möttölä, ‘Drivers of defence integration within the European Union’, p. 9. 
22
 Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, pp. 1-7. 
23
 Alistair J.K. Shepherd, ‘A Milestone in the History of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s International Role’, 
International Affairs 85, No. 3, 2009, p. 516.  
24
 The European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Bulletin EC 6-1999, Cologne. 
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function like a nation-like army with air and naval elements.”25 Up till this day the EU has only 
used these troops for police and peace keeping missions in African countries.  
 
Another key moment that boosted defence integration was the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US. A 
new kind of security threat emerged the EU had to deal with.
26
 The Berlin Plus Agreements in 
2002 made it possible for the EU to access resources of NATO.
27
 Also since 2004 the ministers 
of defence of the member states agreed to set up “battlegroups”. These battlegroups had to be 
deployable within ten days if a conflict emerges. Two battlegroups are constantly standby and 
ready to react when necessary.
28
  
 
The military capabilities of the EU have grown remarkably, but are still relatively small for such 
an big political entity. The EU still is not a credible deterring power. However, more key 
moments like these might enhance the integration process.  
 
Not taking the CSDP seriously  
 
In order to boost the integration process even more the CFSP and the CSDP must overcome 
several difficulties that put a strain on the process of becoming a unified association. As 
mentioned earlier not all member states support the EU’s security and defence policy completely.  
 
Although member states have repeatedly pleaded their support for more integration on this issue 
and even made promises for making an effort in order to create a successful mechanism, when it 
comes to it, member states are turning their heads.
29
 Many member states fail to spend enough on 
defence. This is partially due to the fact that the defence market is fragmented. Only a few, bigger 
member states are able and willing to provide the CSDP with military equipment, logistics and  
 
                                                          
25
 The European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Bulletin EC 12-1999, Helsinki. 
26
 Monica den Boer and Jörg Monar, ’11  September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security 
Actor’, Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 40, September 2002, pp. 11-12.  
27
 Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, p. 558. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid, p. 564.  
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intelligence.
30
 Also the EU depends on the bigger, most influential states when it comes to 
military input. It certainly did not help that all member states have cut back drastically on the 
defence sector during the economic crisis of 2008.
31
  
 
Another reason why the integration process is experiencing difficulties is because member states 
have different interests, traditions and (historical) experiences when is come to tackling security 
threats.
32
 Not every member state experiences the same security dilemma another member state is 
concerned with. Eastern and former Soviet satellite members feel Russia breathing down their 
neck, but the Southern member states are more worried about the high influx of refugees that 
enters their borders.  
 
The organisational structure of the CSDP also leaves much to be desired. The Lisbon Treaty of 
2009 appointed the CSDP with a High Representative. The High Representative tries to create 
coherence between the European Council and the European Commission in order to formulate 
and conduct agreements and is responsible for all missions the CSDP carries out. However, the 
President of the European Council is responsible for the external representation of the EU when it 
comes to the security and defence policy.
33
 This basically means that the EU has two positions 
that both represent the CSDP in some way. If the High Representative and the President of the 
European Council do not see eye to eye, the decision-making process of the CSDP might suffer 
from it. Also the president of de European Commission and the members of the European 
Council, which consists of all state leaders of the member states, are able to block policies if they 
disagree.  
 
 
                                                          
30
 Anand Menon, ‘Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, 2009, pp. 234-
235.  
31
 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘EU-NATO cooperation after the Warsaw Summit’, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf, published in 
December 2016, consulted on the 12
th
 of September 2017. 
32
 Tom Hadden, The Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis-Management Operations Under 
European Security and Defense Policy, Portland: Hart 2009, p. 12. 
33
 Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing The European Community’, Article 13 and 15, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF, consulted on the 12
th
 of August 2017.  
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Another obstacle is that not all member states are confident that the CSDP is able to work well 
together with NATO. Shortly after the CSDP was founded a discussion arose about the dynamic 
between the CSDP and NATO, since it was not clear what kind of tasks the CSDP would 
perform. Some member states were worried the CSDP would compete with NATO instead of 
stepping in a complementary role.
34
 The EU has always said that it does not want to replace or 
work against NATO. In fact, only NATO has the ability and authorisation to deal with security 
threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
35
  
 
The fact that the EU is not completely capable of standing on its own feet when it comes to 
tackling security threats is affecting the credibility of the CSDP. It will be difficult for the EU to 
break loose from the constraints member states and the EU itself put on the security and defence 
framework. This process will also be influenced by the leave of one of the biggest contributors to 
the CSDP: Great Britain. A thorough analysis of the impact that Brexit will have on the 
institutional structure of the EU’s security and defence policy will be made in de next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Niels Lachmann, ‘The EU-NATO-CSDP relationship: asymmetric cooperation and the search for momentum’, 
Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXIII, No. 3 & 4, pp. 185-186. 
35
 Petros Demetriou, ‘NATO and CSDP: Can the EU afford to go solo?, Cogent Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 
2016, p. 7. 
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2. Institutional changes of the EU’s security and 
defence policy after Brexit 
 
“As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able 
to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend 
its members - most of which are European - from external attack, Europeans must be better 
equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to 
act autonomously if and when necessary.”36    
 
This quote comes from the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security 
Policy, which was published a week after a majority of the British people decided they want to 
leave the EU. This strategy sets goals the EU wishes to see fulfilled when it comes to the security 
and defence policy. On almost every page of this policy paper the importance for the EU to work 
more closely together is being emphasized. It is no surprise the Global Strategy was published 
only a week after it became clear the UK would leave the EU, since the EU wants to keep the 
alliance with the remaining member states intact. It is certain that Brexit will have big 
consequences for the European integration process concerning the CSDP, even though 
negotiations about what kind of Brexit will be executed are still ongoing. The UK was the most 
Eurosceptic member state. Despite the fact that the UK helped set up the CSDP, the UK was not 
as enthusiastic and supportive in recent years. The intergovernmental character of the CFSP and 
the CSDP was always ‘protected’ by the UK.37 For example, the UK initially vetoed against the 
creation of a permanent military operational headquarters of the EU.
38
 Even before Brexit is  
 
 
                                                          
36
 European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign And Security Policy’, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, 
Brussels, published June 2016, consulted on 14
th
 of September 2017, p. 19. 
37
 Robin Niblett, ‘Choosing between America and Europe: A new context for British foreign policy’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 83, No.4, pp. 633. 
38
 Richard G. Whitman, ‘The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated 
or Detached?’, National Institute Economic Review, Nr. 238, November 2016, p. 46. 
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finalized this military headquarters is realised, although slightly adapted to the wishes of the 
hesitant member states and with a different, less aggressive-sounding name.
39
 
 
Opportunities after Brexit 
 
The most important objective is that the EU will be stricter when it comes to the input member 
states must deliver. Commitments that have been made in the Lisbon Treaty must be honoured, 
which have not been fulfilled till this day.
40
 This means that the EU will work on their military 
capabilities and the desire to get more autonomy in the decision-making process of the CFSP and 
the CSDP.
41
 Last November twenty-three member states of the EU signed a document in which 
they have pledged to increase their input in the CSDP.
42
 This agreement shows that the 
confidence of the member states in the EU’s security and defence policy grows. 
 
The biggest policy proposal will be the usage of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) 
provisions. PESCO makes it possible for the EU to establish agreements and project which do not 
need the support and consent from all member states.
43
 This would make it easier for the EU to 
conduct missions. Last December the European Council consented this step.
44
 Former defence 
minister of the UK, sir Michael Fallon, has declared that some of these major steps forward will 
not be taken as long as the UK is still a member of the EU, because the Britons believe it might 
undermine the role of NATO.
45
 The UK might not be able to prevent these policies from  
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happening once Brexit is finalised. Therefore, Brexit might pave the way for the EU to take 
matters in their own hands.  
The president of France, Emmanuel Macron, is very much interested in improving European 
integration and together with Angela Merkel, the for the fourth-time re-elected chancellor of 
Germany and big promotor of European cooperation, the integration process concerning security 
and defence probably will move ahead. France and Germany can reenergise their ‘leadership’ in 
the EU, since both countries are more pro-European than the UK ever was and have the ability 
and willingness to make a significant difference in the CSDP.  
 
Difficulties after Brexit  
 
However, it does not look good if one of the strongest players is leaving the team. Beside France, 
the UK is the only member state that has a legitimate military force. The persuasiveness and 
credibility of the EU as an protective military entity might be harmed if the investment of the UK 
falls short. It is not very likely that another member state, next to France, is willing or able to take 
over the role of the UK. Although Germany has expressed its desire to turn the CSDP into a 
credible military force, this big player has a difficult history with militarisation. Germany profited 
from the former French-British axis in the security and defence mechanism of the EU. Although 
the hesitant attitude from the UK was undesirable for the Germans, they could uphold a more 
modest role in the CSDP. Now that the UK is leaving it creates an opportunity for Germany to 
step up and take the integration process of the CSDP to new heights. However, it will feel 
uncomfortable for Germany and other member states if Germany would militarise.
46
 Also, the 
right-wing, Eurosceptic political party Alternative für Deutschland has won 94 seats in the 
Bundestag in the elections of last September, and with their influence it will be more difficult for 
chancellor Merkel to make Germany one of the biggest influencers of the security and defence 
policy of the EU.   
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The UK might also be an inspiration for other member states to take their distance or even leave 
the EU.
47
 Multiple socio-economic developments like the economic crisis, the Euro-crisis in 
Greece, the refugee influx from the African continent and the threat of terrorism caused anti-EU 
sentiments across Europe. Hungary and Italy have welcomed rather Eurosceptic governments and 
even though populist and Eurosceptic parties did not take the lead after elections in key countries 
like France, Germany and the Netherlands, their influence did grow remarkably.  
 
Member states can also form military alliances with other (member) states outside the EU. An 
example of such an agreement are the Lancaster House Treaties. In 2010 France and the UK 
signed the Lancaster House Treaties in order to intensify their security and defence cooperation.  
 
“Believing that greater defence and security co-operation strengthens the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization which remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation and reaffirming their commitment to supporting the role of the European Union’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy in strengthening international security.”48 
 
As this quotation shows both parties committed themselves to the CSDP. However, the CSDP 
was mentioned only this one time in the agreement and the Lancaster House Treaties were 
merely based on the strategic, financial and industrial interests of France and the UK alone. No 
concrete policies were included in the agreement that will push the integration process of the 
CSDP forward. A possible risk of bilateral military alliances is that the CSDP will be side-lined. 
As the Lancaster House Treaties shows, member states might mention their support, but their 
effort for European security remains vague.  
 
Good friends or casual acquaintances? 
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What exactly will happen after Brexit is finalised is still unknown. That depends on the kind of 
relationship the UK and the EU will have after negotiations are closed and the Britons have left 
Brussels. There are likely to be three outcomes that will define the new bond between the EU and 
the UK.
49
 
 
1. The EU can use the financial support and military instruments the UK is able to deliver. 
Therefore, the EU and the UK might decide to keep the UK-membership for the CSDP. This 
might also mean that certain policies that are drawn up in the Global Strategy can be blocked by 
the UK. This way the EU and the UK can influence each other’s agenda.   
 
2. The UK can also become an associated partner of the EU. This bond will be similar to the 
relationship the EU has with Norway. The UK can attend meetings of the CFSP and CSDP and 
will act as an advisor or partner during military missions. This way the UK will stay involved in 
the decision-making process. However, the UK will lose its power to block policies the EU wants 
to implement. It is most likely that the UK prefers this type of relationship. Just before former 
British secretary of Defence Fallon resigned he said that the UK wants to put its military means at 
the disposal of the EU in exchange for a favourable economic and trade agreement.
50
 
 
3. The UK might decide to completely cut ties with the security and defence policy of the EU. 
However, they will not be able to influence the course of the security and defence policy of the 
EU directly. The UK might make bilateral agreements with other states and will focus on their 
role in NATO and their seat in the Security Council of the United Nations.   
 
The UK is not the only English-speaking country that will bring about institutional changes to the 
EU’s security and defence policy. The foreign policy of the US also forces the CSDP to adjust to 
the changing transatlantic partnership. The next chapter will elaborate on this topical theme.   
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3. The cultural difference in foreign policies between the 
Transatlantic partners and the interaction with NATO 
 
“ Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond 
and our partnership with NATO. […] A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with 
the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to 
effective global governance. […] A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake 
of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.”51  
 
For the EU a stable transatlantic bond with the US is crucial for the security of the European 
continent, since the US has been the protector of its European allies ever since World War II. The 
outcome of the presidential elections in the US of 2016 has changed the dynamic of the 
diplomatic relationship between the US and the EU. Even though the US and the EU represent 
the same liberal body of thought, they each have a distinct institutional culture when it comes to 
their foreign policies. In this research culture is defined by facets that characterise the foreign 
policies. These facets entail values, beliefs and behavioural patterns that guide a political actor.
52
  
 
Unilateralism vs. multilateralism 
 
The slogan of the 45
th
 president of the US, Donald Trump, is ‘America first’. This motto reveals 
that the foreign policy under Trumps administration revolves around unilateralism, which means 
that the US wants the ability to act alone without being dependent on other political entities. The 
interests of the US are more important than the interests of allies, even though the US fully 
understands that the health of the transatlantic alliance with the EU is crucial for their position on  
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the world stage.
53
 Trump also makes it clear that he wants to command respect from other 
political actors and wants the world to see American prestige.
54
 The foreign policy of the US is 
focussed on protecting the American honour and reputation by showing of their military 
overweight. The dropping of 'the mother of all bombs', the biggest non-nuclear bomb, on a 
strategic bridge used by ISIS last April in Afghanistan supports this argument. This attack made 
clear that the US will strike if they believe it is necessary. Trump justifies the policies by 
claiming to act in the interest of the American public.
55
 The US is a military super power and 
wants to do whatever it takes to stay the military hegemon, which means they have a tremendous 
military strength and still make large investments in this policy area.
56
 Even though this has been 
the case for decades, the US has also been through periods where they sought a more soft 
approach. However, under Trumps administration projection of hard power is a crucial element 
of the foreign policy of the US, which can be best understood from the realist perspective. 
 
The member states of the EU each have a foreign policy of their own. Since the founding of the 
CSDP the EU works on converting these national strategies into one European military culture. In 
order to make the national strategies compatible the EU needs to create social cohesion among its 
member states.
57
 This is a difficult task, but the EU becomes more successful in creating a culture 
in which the member states can work more intensely together. The foreign policy of the EU can 
be characterised by multilateralism, which means the EU prefers to act together with partners, 
and revolves around engagement. The multilateral approach is not only used inside the CFSP and 
CSDP, but also the strategy for fruitful alliances with other political entities. By acting jointly the 
harmony of interests is served best. For the EU cooperation is essential, which means the EU’s 
foreign policy fits the liberal framework. However, the construction of a military culture is as 
typical constructivist phenomenon.  
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Even though the cultural characteristics of the foreign policies of the transatlantic partners differ 
from each other, there are also similarities. Both players value the significance of the legislative 
body of their foreign policies, have oversight of the executive power and they have a budgetary 
power which gives them the ability to make investments in their defence industries.
58
 They are 
the biggest promotors of liberal values. Among those are democracy, human rights and the liberal 
market. These similarities form the foundation of a powerful alliance. Both power blocks are also 
tied together because of their economic bond and the historical legacy of many Americans who 
have European roots.
59
 These reasons make it very unlikely that the alliance will change 
drastically. 
 
No more free riding with the US 
 
However, Trump demands that the EU takes more responsibility for their own security. He wants 
the European members of NATO to take more responsibility for their own safety.
60
 In 2014 the 
members of NATO officially pledged that they would spend 2% of their GDP on the defence 
sector.
61
 Till this day only five European member states have kept their end of the bargain. 
Trump accuses the European member states of freeriding.
62
Although the discussion about 
burden-sharing inside NATO is not new, the European member states never felt a desperate need 
for building a sufficient military alliance of its own. That is partially due to the very existence of 
NATO and its reliance on American leadership. Although in theory NATO is an alliance between 
member states, in practice the organisation depends for the most part on the input of the US. 
During the Cold War the European continent was the centre of attention for NATO. The 
permanent presence of American troops in Europe was one of the reasons the EU never felt  
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pressure to work on an security and defence policy of their own. This was for the most part 
intentional because it was always in the interest of the US to keep Europe relatively weak 
concerning their military capacities in order to safeguard their military hegemony.
63
  
 
Now that Trump has entered the White House, the US has become even more critical about the 
‘laziness’ of the European allies. During the Cold War the US was under high pressure for 
decades because of the constant threat of an nuclear attack from the SU. American sentiment 
makes is difficult to sympathise with European partners who feel threatened by Russia. The US is 
not interested in getting involved into a similar crisis with Russia again. The US also sees the 
potential of the EU.
64
 Although the EU does not project hard power, it does have the ability and 
financial resources to develop a legitimate security and defence mechanism. If the EU would take 
more responsibility for their own safety, the US would not always have to come to the rescue 
when a security dilemma occurs on European territory.  
 
It would be unwise for the EU to take Trump's sayings lightly. Security threats might get out of 
hand and the safety of nation states that are part of the transatlantic partnership will be at risk if 
the transatlantic partnership deteriorates.
65
 The EU also depends on the military equipment of the 
US and cannot defend its members if the US decides to cut back on European defence. Without 
the military input of the US, the EU has a big problem providing safety for its members. It is in 
the interest of the US to support the integration process of the CSDP because it will relieve them 
of several defensive duties they have on the European continent and make the EU less dependent. 
They can shift their attention to other parts of the world that might require intervention or 
involvement.
66
 Both parties also benefit greatly from NATO. NATO is the key instrument which 
keeps the US and the EU in dialogue with each other. Through NATO both parties can influence 
each other's security and defence agenda.
67
 Therefore, Trump’s quotes about Europe’s lack of  
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input might function as a catalyst for the integration process of the EU’s security and defence 
policy.  
 
The CSDP in relation to NATO 
 
NATO was set up in 1949 in order to protect the capitalist, Western world from the communist 
SU during the Cold War. The initial idea was that NATO would no longer be needed after the SU 
collapsed. However, NATO has not dissolved after the iron curtain fell. In fact, NATO still 
functions as the security guard of the European continent. The CSDP does not have the ability to 
tackle security threats with military strength without help. The dysfunctional organisational 
structure of the CSDP makes it difficult for the EU to grow military muscles. Since the EU is not 
likely to overcome this shortcoming anytime soon, it still depends on NATO for military backup. 
Both institutions want to benefit from this dependency. 
 
Both parties are willing to take their collaboration to the next level. That became apparent at the 
NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 where the EU and NATO signed a Joint Declaration. 
 
“In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we 
need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is 
interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the 
challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger 
NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in 
Europe and beyond.”68 
 
In the Joint Declaration the EU and NATO agreed to work more closely together on analysis, 
early detection, crisis prevention, better coordination, intelligence sharing and strategic 
communication. The objective that will help the integration process of the CSDP move forward 
the most, will be the facilitation of a stronger defence industry by stimulating industrial  
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cooperation in Europe which will increase the military capabilities of the EU. Both parties want 
to see these agreements fulfilled rather sooner than later, because “cooperation in these areas is a 
strategic priority”.69 Yet there are several difficulties both institutions have to face. Both 
institutions have to deal with hesitance and a lack of confidence of member states. This applies 
mainly for the EU. However strong partnership benefits both institutions. A stronger EU will also 
help NATO become stronger.
70
  
 
Therefore, dependency of the CSDP on NATO is not necessarily a bad thing. The CSDP and 
NATO can complement each other in the areas the other party is best at. Even though the CSDP 
is the hard edge of the EU’s soft character, it is still a power who is hesitant to use military force 
as long as other non-military means are not effective. NATO has the power to persuade and deter 
with military resources, but may also benefit from the EU’s excellence in the usage of soft power 
methods. Each institution has different characteristics. They can increase their influence by 
joining hands.
71
 An example that can support this argument is the approach the EU is taking in 
the dichotomy between the pro-Western and pro-Russian sympathizers in Ukraine. The EU has 
supported the Ukrainian government, who wants to join the liberal, Western world and has 
condemned the provocative attitude of Russia. Together with economic sanctions from the EU 
that have been imposed on Russia, the EU backs NATO with non-military means, who has 
stationed troops in the region for the purpose of deterrence.
72
 Whether the partnership is as 
successful in this example is questionable, as chapter four will reveal. 
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4. Russian influence on the EU’s security and defence policy  
 
“Peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s violation of international law and 
the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have 
challenged the European security order at its core. […] We will not recognise Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. We will strengthen the 
EU, enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours, and uphold their right to determine freely 
their approach towards the EU.”73 
 
This statement from the EU about Russia’s expansionist tendencies is quite bold. Since the 
violations happened so close to EU territory, it created a geopolitical crisis. The annexation of 
Crimea proved to be an opportunity for the CSDP to show what it is worth, because this 
institution was set up in order to protect the EU’s interests, resolve conflicts and to make a 
contribution to international security. Therefore, the CSDP had to be invoked immediately after 
the annexation of Crimea. However, it was not properly addressed as an policy instrument during 
the crisis that followed. Again a strategic vision was missing because member states could not 
come to terms. As a result the CSDP could not operate in full effect.
74
 
 
The EU struggles with its role in the Ukraine crisis, since it wants to reassure its member states 
and partners, but does not want to provoke Russia. The last thing the EU wants is to get involved 
into a military conflict with Russia, but ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
Russian violation of the maritime and airspace of other countries, former satellite states of the SU 
of which several are current member states of the EU, feel threatened. Therefore, Russia’s foreign 
policy is of great influence to the security and defence policy of the EU. The EU must live up to 
its statements that were made in the Global Strategy of 2016 if it wants to take steps forward in 
the integration process concerning its defensive mechanism. That Russia is not even mentioned  
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once in the first official review of the Global Strategy, that was published a year later, is 
remarkable.
75
 
 
Upcoming Russia 
 
Ever since the SU collapsed in 1991 the world community thought that the constant tension 
between the capitalist West and the communist Soviets vanished and a new status quo was 
reached. The former SU turned into the Russian Federation which was left with the remains of 
the communist regime. This system had put a strain on the Russian economy. Since then the 
bipolar world order evolved into a unipolar one, with the US as hegemon. However, it did not 
take long for Russia to resurrect and develop into an economic and military superpower. The 
West might have underestimated the aspirations of Russia now that its influence is growing in 
Central and East Europe, which affect the political settlement that evolved after the Cold War 
ended.
76
  
 
With the rise of a strong Russia old tensions arose also. Russia has many interests in Central and 
East Europe. Some of which clash with that of the EU and NATO. Russia is not hesitant to fight 
for their interests with hard power. This became clear when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 with 
coarse ordnance. Although Georgia is not a EU or NATO member, both institutions are very 
eager to bind Georgia to the West. Especially democratisation processes in Georgia are being 
supported by the EU and NATO. The triangular bond between Ukraine, Russia and the EU was 
always quite tense, because of the pro-Western and pro-Russian sentiments that divides Ukraine. 
The annexation of Crimea affected the diplomatic relationship between the EU and Russia 
negatively. Again the EU was confronted with the military side of Russia. 
 
Georgia and Ukraine both dealt with military interference of Russia. Both countries are also 
flirting with the EU for a closer connection with the West. This partnership has been made 
official with Association Agreements. An Association Agreement between the EU and a non-EU  
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country realises a better bond when it comes to economic, political, social and security 
cooperation. The Association Agreement with Georgia entered into force in July 2016. Although 
the people of the Netherlands voted against an Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine via an advisory referendum, the Association Agreement with Ukraine became 
operational in September 2017. These Association Agreements contain policies that clash with 
the interests of Russia. Therefore, Russia has used soft power methods, like a boycott of 
Ukrainian products entering Russia and diminishing the export of Russian gas to EU-countries, in 
order to undermine the influence of the EU.
77
 Especially the Ukraine crisis proved to be a tug of 
war between the EU and Russia. The combination of economic and diplomatic sanctions of the 
EU and the stationing of NATO-troops close to the Russian borders, has antagonised Russia even 
more.
78
 The EU is facing a dilemma: it wants to build on a close relationship with Ukraine, but 
that jeopardises the shaky relationship with Russia. At this point is seems impossible for Brussels 
to come to an agreement with Kiev and Moscow about the political engagement of Ukraine with 
the EU and with Russia.
79
  
 
Not only on the European continent do Russia and EU member states find themselves on opposite 
sides of a military conflict. The civil war and the fight against ISIS in Syria caused security and 
strategic dilemmas as well for the Western coalition as for Russia. Russia supports the 
controversial president Bashar al-Assad of Syria while the West strongly condemns the war 
crimes the Syrian president would have committed. Both parties want to fight terrorist 
organisations in the Middle East, but cooperation does not go smoothly. Based on conflicts like 
these Central and East EU-member states are worried attention might shift away from the 
Russian threat they fear.
80
 The troubles in Syria also give Russia a bargaining position. Russia 
might be willing to cooperate fighting terrorism, in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO-forces  
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in Central and East European countries. Therefore, the unrest in the Middle East is also affecting 
the security position of the EU on the European continent.
81
 
 
Expansion of the West 
 
A reason why Russia feels the need to increase its influence in Central and East Europe is 
because of the growing influence of NATO and the EU since the 1990’s. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter NATO did not dissolve after the ending of the Cold War. In fact, NATO and the 
EU expanded eastwards and gained many members states. Several were former Soviet satellite 
states. In the eyes of Russia, NATO became an influential club of liberal democracies instead of a 
defensive framework.
82
 Both NATO and the EU exploited the temporary strategic weakness of 
Russia.
83
 However, many ethnic-Russians still live in former Soviet satellite states. Russia 
legitimises its actions because Moscow claims it wants to protect Russian minorities in former 
Soviet states.
84
 
 
The EU was able to expand so quickly after the fall of the Iron Curtain because of what the 
institution had to offer. In order to join the EU a candidate state must be a democratic country, 
uphold the rule of law and share the norms and values the EU stands for. The economies of the 
nation states that joined the EU in the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement rounds, flourished under 
the concept of free market. The EU also functioned as a safe haven for nation states that were 
suppressed for so long and now became formally equal to any other member state of the EU. The 
former satellite states did not mind giving up a bit of sovereignty to Brussels, as long as they 
were not overruled. In other words, the EU did not dominate these countries with military 
strength.
85
 The EU is also actively involved in other non-EU states in South and East Europe. The 
EU and its neighbourhood policy (ENP) have programs with which they try to create diplomatic  
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and economic relationships that are based on the principle of the EU’s acquis communautaire.86 
Together with the Association Agreements that the EU has with several East European nation 
states, the EU has thus continuously spread its influence on the European continent in a rapid 
pace, after the ending of the Cold War. Russia sees the rapid expansion of NATO and the EU in 
East Europe as a way for the West to dictate its believes and suppress Russia, as Russia’s foreign 
minister Sergey Lavrov stated in 2013.
87
 
 
Motives based on theory 
 
The EU and NATO have worked on their integration processes, without properly considering the 
strategic position, interests and aspirations of Russia. Instead of Russia becoming a strategic 
security partner, it has created security concerns on the European continent. This is a direct 
consequence of the EU’s eagerness to liberalise the Eastern European neighbourhood.88 The West 
focused on global governance and did not consider the concept of geopolitics to be accurate for 
the Kremlin. In fact, the EU itself acted on its geopolitical aspirations, which has jeopardised the 
harmony of interests.  
 
One can argue that the EU’s interference in non-EU countries, like Ukraine, is also an expression 
of its geopolitical aspirations in order to improve their influential sphere on the continent.
89
 
Therefore, realism is an explanatory theory for the relatively rapid enlargement rounds of the EU. 
The logic of realism is applicable to the narratives of both parties. Russia protects its core 
interests from the West, who tries to influence the direct neighbourhood of Russia. International 
agreements and diplomacy becomes secondary when the national security and interests of a 
nation state are at stake. This is why Russia invaded Crimea, even though they were condemned  
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for it by the West.
90
 The Kremlin has partially justified its actions based on the ‘aggressiveness’ 
of NATO.
91
 The Russian annexation of Crimea and its role in the Ukraine crisis can also be seen 
as an act of balancing power, now that the EU and NATO have increased their influences in 
Central and East Europe.
92
 
 
The realist approach cannot explain all facets, like ideational and cultural ones, that have caused 
this security dilemma. The West might have underestimated the remains of the Soviet regime that 
are still affecting the foreign policy of Russia. The foreign policy of Russia is based on different 
values, beliefs and behaviour patterns, which are constructed by different social and historical 
experiences. Therefore, the assumption of Western institutions that Russia would instantly 
embrace the capitalist free principles of the Western world and accept American dominance in 
the new world order, after the Cold War ended, was very naïve.
93
  
 
Dilemma: soft vs. hard approach  
  
It may seem that the EU and Russia have drifted further apart from each other even since the 
Cold War ended, but that is not the case. Between the fall off the SU and the Ukraine crisis the 
EU and Russia actually sought rapprochement. Russia and the EU came closer together because 
of industrial and economic dependency. Almost all member states of the EU are great consumers 
of Russian gas and oil. The EU does not have a good alternative for Russian energy. Russia is 
just as dependent on the EU as vice versa. The EU is the biggest export market of Russia. Also, 
the EU invests greatly in Russian business life. In fact, the EU is of vital interest to the wellbeing 
of the Russian economy and a cornerstone of Russia’s energy policy.94 If the economy of Russia 
or the EU is stagnating, the income from export of the other party is affected negatively. Thus, a 
deteriorating diplomatic relationship and the imposition of sanctions has severe consequences for  
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both parties. Therefore, militarising is probably not the best reaction for the EU to the foreign 
policy of Russia. 
 
Russia has proven to be quite unpredictable. This is also a strong reason for the EU to continue 
confronting Russia with more soft power methods.
95
 A way to contain Russia might be for the 
EU to seek rapprochement by increasing its investments in Russia. This way, Russia becomes 
more dependent and military escalation is less likely to happen.
96
 It is also not likely for Russia to 
invade countries that are EU or NATO-member, although Russian propaganda and nationalism 
might indicate otherwise. Creating the image of a strong Kremlin with a strong leader like Putin 
is also a strategy that must mask the economic stress the country is in.
97
 The image that is 
portrayed inside Russia does not correspond with reality. The EU knows that Russia will not 
invade member states of NATO, because Moscow knows that an attack on one member is an 
attack on all members.  
 
The EU is also occupied with internal disputes. EU-member Bulgaria and Moldova, with whom 
the EU signed an Association Agreement with and a potential candidate for EU-membership, 
have welcomed pro-Russian presidents.
98
 Also, member states who feel threatened the most do 
not necessarily promote a military developed EU, because they believe the EU can never provide 
security of its members without the support of NATO. In its current state the CSDP can definitely 
not operate with hard power without the providence of NATO. Therefore, trust in NATO is 
bigger than the faith EU member states in Central and East Europe put in the CSDP.
99
 NATO and 
EU member states who also have close ties with Moscow, may even seek rapprochement to 
Russia in order to relieve some of the tension they experience from Russia.
100
 This would be  
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dramatic for the EU, since the security and defence policy benefits mostly when all member 
states are supportive of this policy area. 
 
Even though militarising might increase the risk of escalation, the EU might have no other option 
but to work on their hard power capabilities, if it becomes necessary to use this kind of power. As 
mentioned in chapter two, the UK might decide to completely withdraw from the CSDP. The US 
could also decide to cut back on their military investments in European defence. Without the 
input of these two powerhouses, the EU has to work double as hard to provide safety for its 
member states. These scenarios are not very likely to happen, but a political actor must be able to 
project soft and hard power in order to safeguard its existence, as realists would say. 
 
Important is that the EU keeps an open dialogue with Russia. However, that might not be as easy 
as it seems. The diplomatic relationship hit a new low when the EU decided to withdraw their 
ambassador from Moscow in response to the poisoning of Sergey Skripal, a former double spy 
who worked for MI6, and his daughter. The UK accused Russia of committing this crime. The 
EU proved to be solidary to this leaving member state. Moscow denied the accusation and in 
return condemned the diplomatic sanctions that have been imposed on them. The EU ambassador 
returned quite quickly to Moscow, but more conflicts like these and the diplomatic relationship 
will deteriorate even more. When there is no proper dialogue between both power blocks, Russia 
becomes more unpredictable when it comes to its geopolitical aspirations on the European 
continent.  
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5. Final analysis: the future of the CSDP according to  
IR-theories 
 
“The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, 
because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian 
power” does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently 
deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving 
under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For 
Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand.”101 
  
The EU is clear about the fact that it sees itself as an security agent who should be able to 
perform hard power. However, this kind of power is rarely being activated, since Brussels has 
difficulty getting all member states on the same page. Combined with the fact that not all member 
states are able or willing to contribute their fair share, the EU’s security and defence policy is 
troubled by these shortcomings. This makes a successful cooperation difficult. A drastic change 
of the organisational structure of the CSDP is necessary. This is why PESCO is being 
implemented as we speak. This new policy is the most promising push factor of the integration 
process of the EU’s security and defence policy and will be used in this analysis to make an 
interesting hypothesis about the CSDP’s future.  
 
PESCO can be seen as an umbrella which harbours several agreements. This policy issue makes 
sure the EU does not have to collect everyone’s ‘yes’ when it wants to implement policies. This 
means that the EU can go on missions not all member states have to agree upon or take part of. 
This makes it much easier for the EU to conduct military missions and make a difference when it 
comes to the prevention or resolve of a security dilemma. Because member states themselves 
decide to support a proposal or take part in a mission, they are willing to make an effort. They 
have to agree upon the input the participating member states are willing and able to deliver. 
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Up to seventeen military projects are being conducted since 2018. One of the biggest agreements 
of this policy is the creation of a military Schengen zone. This initiative will make it easier to 
transport military troops and means across the borders of participating member states. Also, the 
regulation of transport of military equipment will be less strict. Especially this last element of 
PESCO will benefit European security, since the current multitude of rules slows down the 
militarising process.  
 
Once the projects of PESCO bear fruit, the EU has more military means at its disposal which they 
can use more frequently.
102
 PESCO will also create a community in which the member states are 
in constant dialogue with each other about security and defence issues.
103
 As mentioned in the 
theoretical framework of this research, communication is essential during the construction of a 
common culture. Therefore, PESCO is a major contribution to the common culture the EU works 
on so hard. From a constructivist point of view this new policy leads to more integration.                   
 
PESCO makes sure the member states are devoted to collaborate. This makes it an typically 
liberal agreement. The strategic cultures of the member states are being matched, which is in the 
interest of all member states. This makes PESCO the ultimate mechanism for cooperation among 
its members. This eventually will lead to new institutional developments inside the CSDP, which 
will increase the legitimacy of this policy area of the EU. Since the CSDP does not have the most 
promising and persuasive reputation, it benefits greatly if the reputation betters. The theory of 
liberal institutionalism promises a bright future for the security and defence framework of the 
EU. 
  
Despite the promising successes that PESCO will generate, not all EU members are convinced 
that European security will benefit from this innovative policy. At this time twenty-five member 
states have committed themselves to PESCO. Denmark and Malta are still hesitant about 
supporting the agreement, because they fear it will jeopardise their neutrality in certain situations.  
                                                          
102
 Sven Biscop, ‘Differentiated Integration in Defence: A Plea for PESCO, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60_1.pdf, published on the 6
th
 of February 2017, consulted on the 24
th
 of April 
2018, p. 4. 
103
 Jo Coelmont, ‘Permanent Sovereign COoperation to Underpin the EU Global Strategy’, Egmont Security Policy 
Brief, No. 80, December 2016, p. 2 
  
 
 
41 
 
 
Although they are able to officially join PESCO at any time, their hesitance shows that the 
national interest still goes before the interests of all member states. This is why the decision-
making process of this specific policy area is still directly done by the member states themselves. 
The members have the power to withdraw their support from PESCO-projects. From a realist 
point of view one can say that the hesitance of EU-members and the lack of complete support for 
all policy proposals by PESCO-members shows that PESCO cannot stimulate the integration 
process of the EU's security and defence policy to the fullest.  
 
Even though not every member state of the EU is on board, PESCO will make sure there is less 
differentiation and more cooperation among the member states, which gives the EU the ability to 
perform hard power when needed. Many projects are being initiated as we speak. Therefore, the 
following years are promising for the integration process of the EU’s security and defence policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
“First of all, the Global Strategy has served as a springboard to relaunch the process of 
European integration after the British referendum. One year ago, after that referendum, many 
predicted an “inevitable” decline of the European Union, and imagined that the Global Strategy 
would stay in a drawer or would very soon look outdated. […] On the contrary, we have moved 
fast – and united – on concrete implementation, starting with security and defence. In this field, 
more has been achieved in the last ten months than in the last ten years”104 
 
This quote comes from Frederica Mogherini, the High Representative of the CFSP. The EU did 
achieve several goals that will make the security and defence mechanism more effective. With 
the implementation of PESCO the EU will finally achieve commitment from a large group of 
member states who are willing to work on a common objective.  
 
The EU is known for being a soft power who makes an effort for the harmony of interests. 
Although, in the CSDP the member states have the final say, instead of Brussels. The interests of 
the member states come before the harmony of interest. Not all member states are convinced 
Europe should work on its capability to use hard power. Some member states are afraid the EU 
might jeopardise the relationship with NATO, since an own security and defence policy might 
not complement but compete with the policy of NATO. This fear seems to be unjustified, because 
the EU and NATO have made solid agreements. NATO will help the EU with the facilitation of a 
legitimate defence industry and the EU will have access to the military equipment of NATO.  
 
From a constructivist perspective the EU needs to find common ground in order to enhance the 
integration process of its security and defence policy. The interests of the member states can be 
best served if there is a common cultural environment in the CSDP. It is a difficult task in itself to 
bridge the cultural differences that have arisen through historical experiences. This is another 
reason not all member states are as supportive of the CSDP. 
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However, now might be the right time for the EU to stimulate the integration process even more. 
First of all, Brexit might create opportunities. If the UK cut ties with Brussels in this policy area 
once they leave, the EU is able to go through with policy proposals the UK might otherwise 
block. If this scenario plays out, the EU does need to find a solution for the gap the UK is leaving 
behind. Despite the hesitant attitude of the Britons, the UK is one of the strongest players when it 
comes to delivering equipment that benefits the hard power status of the EU. Negotiations about 
how the new relationship between the EU and UK will look like, when it comes to the security 
and defence policy, are still ongoing. Both parties do share the same interests and represent the 
same ideals. A complete breakup is not likely to happen, but the CSDP will undergo institutional 
changes because of the British departure. 
 
The CSDP is also confronted with a crisis of a geopolitical nature. The EU wants to be able to 
stand up to Russia. Ever since the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis, the diplomatic 
relationship between the EU and Russia deteriorated fast. These events showed how the interests 
of the EU clash with the interests of Russia. Russia has close ties with this region based on 
economic, cultural and historical elements. However, after the SU collapsed the EU managed to 
take many former Soviet states under their liberal wing. The ideological contrast has caused a 
security dilemma. The EU needs to take action, but it is not wise to use hard power in order to 
deter Russia, because combined interests are at stake. Russia depends on European investments 
and the EU depends on Russian energy. Also, the EU knows that Russia will not invade EU 
territories, because most member states are also NATO-member. It would be unwise if Putin 
would order his troops to restore all of the former SU. Therefore, the tension Russia creates does 
not necessarily mean the EU has no other option but to militarise.  
 
At this stage the EU cannot face Russia alone. Brussels still depends on the US. However, the 
election of Donald Trump as new president of the US emphasized the cultural differences 
between the foreign policies of the US and the EU, which have created tension in their joint 
action in security providence. Under Trump’s rule, the foreign policy of the US can be qualified 
as unilateral and typically realistic, which means the US wants to be able to act alone. The CFSP 
revolves around multilateralism and wants to tackle security threats together. A consequence of  
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the American posture is that Trump wants the European member states of NATO to step up. 
Trump is in office for over a year now and we can say that NATO is still closely interlinked with 
the EU and it does not seem that the American input will drop drastically. Therefore, the safety of 
the member states of the EU still confidently lies in the hands of NATO. However, if Trump 
would choose to cut in the expenditure on security and defence for the European continent, the 
EU might have to fend for itself. Realists would argue that the EU needs to work on a legitimate 
military power if it wants to protect the interests of its members, because a political entity cannot 
guarantee its existence without a proper security and defence policy. 
 
As the title of the Global Strategy of 2016 suggests, the member states of the EU must find a 
shared vision and common ground in other to take action. This will create a ‘stronger Europe’. At 
this moment, the EU is still searching for its singular voice on security issues, that might require a 
hard approach. However, Brussels is on the right track. The policy propositions that were 
presented in the Global Strategy of 2016 will give the EU more tools for the use of hard power. 
These policy proposals were presented shortly after the Ukraine crisis was at its peak, the Brexit 
was proclaimed and Trump was one of the two contestants for the presidency in the US. It is 
evident that these geopolitical, institutional and cultural factors contribute to the acceleration of 
the integration process of the EU’s security and defence policy.  
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